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Abstract. The recent surge of interest in the origin of the temporal asym-
metry of thermodynamical systems (including the accessible part of the
universe itself) put forward two possible explanatory approaches to this
age-old problem. Hereby we show that there is a third possible alterna-
tive, based on the generalization of the classical (“Boltzmann-Schuetz”) an-
thropic fluctuation picture of the origin of the perceived entropy gradient.
This alternative (which we dub the Acausal-Anthropic approach) is based
on accepting Boltzmann’s statistical measure at its face value, and accomo-
dating it within the quantum cosmological concept of the multiverse. We
argue that conventional objections raised against the Boltzmann-Schuetz
view are less forceful and serious than it is usually assumed. A fortiori,
they are incapable of rendering the generalized theory untenable. On the
contrary, this analysis highlights some of the other advantages of the mul-
tiverse approach to the thermodynamical arrow of time.
Keywords: entropy; arrow of time; anthropic principle; philosophy of
cosmology
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If the doors of perception were cleansed,
everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.
William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell” (1793)
1. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF
THERMODYNAMICAL EXPLANANDUM
The problem of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics—already more
than a century old in its modern form!—is the following. In our experience,
systems increase in entropy in the forward direction of time. The underlying
dynamical laws, which are taken to govern thermodynamic systems, how-
ever, are symmetric in time: statistical mechanics predicts that entropy is
overwhelmingly likely to increase in both temporal directions. So where does
the asymmetry of thermodynamics and of our experience generally come
from? It was, of course, the great Ludwig Boltzmann who—prompted by
Loschmidt, Culverwell and Burbury (joined later by Zermelo)—asked that
deep question, contingent on his statistical explanation of thermodynamical
phenomena; in his words, “is the apparent irreversibility of all known nat-
ural processes consistent with the idea that all natural events are possible
without restriction?”(1)
During the last decade we have been witnessing a renaissance of inter-
est in the problem of thermodynamical asymmetry of the world around us
among physicists and philosophers alike (e.g., Refs. 2-7). In two recent
remarkably clear and interesting papers, Australian philosopher of science
Huw Price attempted to show that there are two competing projects for
the explanation of the perceived thermodynamical asymmetry, which he la-
bels Causal-General and Acausal-Particular approaches.(8,9) Furthermore,
his intention was to show the superiority of the Acausal-Particular approach,
which is in accordance with other pieces of his atemporal worldview, which
he also presented in his recent brilliant monograph on the subject of tem-
poral asymmetries (Ref. 3). The answer Price advocates relies on a low-
entropy initial boundary condition: if the initial state of the universe is
one of extremely low entropy, then Boltzmannian statistical considerations
yield an overwhelmingly likely entropy increase towards the future through-
out the history of the universe. Price contrasts this account—a version of
what he calls the Acausal-Particular approach—with those theories that de-
rive thermodynamic asymmetry from some underlying asymmetric causal or
dynamical mechanism operating at all times (like the quantum-mechanical
state reduction in quantum theories with dynamical reduction), what he
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calls Causal-General views (cf. Ref. 5). Causal-General views necessar-
ily contradict Boltzmann’s attitude toward the time-reversal asymmetry:
“This one-sidedness lies uniquely and solely in the initial conditions.” To
Price’s mind, these two kinds of account are the only serious contenders to
explain the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics.
In this paper, we would like to show that this account (implicitly ac-
cepted by other recent writers on the topic) is biased and lacking some
important ingredients. While the desire for clarification of the common ex-
planatory task is highly commendable, it is important that the taxonomy
is kept both maximally comprehensive and just. The suggested taxonomy
fails in one important respect: it fails to notice an alternative to both the
Causal-General and Acausal-Particular views. Therefore, we would like
here to point out that from Price’s Acausal-Particular approach bifurcates
another option which deserves a separate mention in reviewing the ways to-
ward the explanation of thermodynamical asymmetry. This third approach
differs markedly from the other two in its conception of what needs to be
done to solve the puzzle. In proposing this, we follow the lead of Price
himself who, introducing his two proposals, points out that (Ref. 9, sec.
1.1)
So far as I know, the distinction between these two ap-
proaches has not been drawn explicitly by other writers. With-
out it, it is not easy to appreciate the possibility that many famil-
iar attempts to explain the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics
might be not mistaken so much as misconceived—addressed to
the wrong problem, in looking for time-asymmetry in the wrong
place.
We shall see that, unfortunately, “those who use the sword will be killed
by the sword”, and that there are several instances in which Price’s own
favorite proposal is misconceived, for exactly the same reason: searching for
a solution to the puzzle in the wrong place.
The second goal of the present note is to demonstrate that the classi-
cal arguments (accepted unquestioningly by Zeh, Price, Albert and other
contemporary authors) against the classical Boltzmann-Schuetz anthropic
fluctuation picture are much less forceful than it was hitherto assumed.
This serves an important role in bringing the atypical initial cosmological
conditions within the domain of physical explanation.
2. ACAUSAL-ANTHROPIC APPROACH
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Our first motivation is a full and faithful acceptance of Price’s account of
the nature of the explanatory task ahead (Ref. 8, section 2.2):
First of all, let’s assume that basic explanatory questions are
of the form: ’Given that C, why E rather than F?’ The thought
here is that we never explain things in isolation. We always
take something as already given, and seek to explain the target
phenomena in the light of that. C represents this background,
and E the target phenomenon. (C might comprise accepted
laws, as well as ’boundary conditions’ being treated as ’given’
and unproblematic for the purposes at hand.)
We should, naturally, seek to make C maximally comprehensive. Obvi-
ously, our existence as observers is part of the necessary background. Should
it not be included in C? (“It is very much in the spirit of scientific inquiry to
welcome any theory which widens the range of applicability of science.”—
Ref. 10, p. 74) In most practical physical applications it is irrelevant, at
least in the first approximation (and therefore is usually omitted, although
reasons for the omission are seldom explicated). Our existence as observers
hardly impacts on the explanatory project for, say, matter-enhanced neu-
trino oscillations or fractional Hall effect. However, in the cosmological
context, leaving observers out of the picture does not lead to happy conse-
quences, as was first shown by Dicke and Carter in 1960s and 1970s. The
debate between Dirac and Dicke on the nature of explanatory projects for
the “large number coincidences” is especially instructive in this respect,
since several parallels with the projects for explaining thermodynamical
asymmetry can be drawn. The reader may recall that the famous “Dirac’s
hypothesis” (or the “large-number hypothesis”) to explain the ubiquitous
dimensionless number 1040, came from a bold suggestion that all these nu-
merical coincidences are in fact exact equations related to the age of the
universe.(11) In other words, the relevant number is large because the uni-
verse is old.
From this profound and simple (but wrong!) idea, Dirac and later inves-
tigators (e.g., Ref. 12) have deduced a wealth of extremely interesting and
challenging empirical predictions, the most famous being the decrease in the
Newtonian gravitational constant G during cosmological evolution. Using
the completely opposite approach, Dicke(13) has suggested that large number
coincidences are observed only because any conceivably different values to
such dimensionless quantities would be incompatible with our existence as
intelligent observers (and consequently the relationships are only approx-
imate). Consequently, the two explanatory projects, Dirac’s and Dicke’s,
found themselves in the open arena of physical investigations.
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Not only has subsequent empirical evidence disproved Dirac’s ideas; no-
tably, the decreasing G has been spectacularly falsified by experiments with
the Viking space probes, as well as in the binary pulsar experiments,(14,15)
but more important is the fact that the subsequent developments show
Dirac’s general approach to be rather sterile in comparison to Dicke’s. What
we are really interested in here is a comparison of explanatory approaches.
We can schematically compare the view of the large-numbers explanandum
in this case:
Dirac: “objective” coincidences (no properties of observers included in
C);
Dicke: “observed” coincidences (properties of observers included in C).
The outcome of that particular duel should warn us against dogmatism
when cosmological theories are the subject of inquiry.1
With this in mind, we propose a novel approach to the explanation of
thermodynamical asymmetry, one which could be labeled (for the reasons
explained below) the Acausal-Anthropic approach. It represents a Dicke-like
approach applied to the specific problem of thermodynamical asymmetry
and the nature (entropy-wise) of the cosmological initial conditions. To
understand what this proposal encompasses, perhaps the best way is to use
Price’s “parsing” the natural phenomena for the different approaches (Ref.
8, §2.3; Ref. 9, §3.1-3.2). Applied to the Acausal-Anthropic approach, it
may look like this:
Symmetric boundary conditions—entropy high in the past
Symmetric default condition—entropy likely to be high (always)
+ Asymmetric observational selection effect
Observed asymmetry
This should be compared with similar parsing schemes for the Causal-
General:
Asymmetric boundary condition—entropy low in the past
+ Asymmetric law-like tendency—entropy constrained to increase
1 In spite of the fact that Dirac himself emphasized the “optimistic” nature of his
explanation in comparison: “On Dicke’s assumption habitable planets could exist only
for a limited period of time. With my assumption they could exist indefinitely in the future
and life need never end.”(16) This goes some steps toward addressing vulgar objections still
heard in some quarters that anthropic explanations are anthropocentric or even “cozy”
(e.g., Ref. 17).
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Observed asymmetry
and Acausal-Particular views(8):
Asymmetric boundary condition—entropy low in the past
+ Symmetric default condition—entropy likely to be high, ceteris paribus
Observed asymmetry.
The basic idea of the Acausal-Anthropic approach is that, having al-
ready received from (quantum) cosmology a useful notion of the multiverse,
we could as well employ it in order to account for the prima facie extremely
improbable choice of (local) initial conditions. In other words, we imagine
that everything that exists, for which we shall use the term multiverse,2
represents a “Grand Stage” for the unfolding of—among other things—the
thermodynamical histories of chunks of matter. Entropy in the multiverse
is high almost everywhere and at all times (“almost” here meaning “every-
where minus a possible subset of small or zero measure”). In other words,
the multiverse is, formally speaking, in the state of “heat death”, as en-
visaged by classical thermodynamics.(18,19) Our cosmological domain (“the
universe”) represents a natural fluctuation—presumably of small or zero
measure; but the anthropic selection effect answers the question “why do
we find ourselves on an upward slope of such a fluctuation?” Hence what
needs explaining is not that there are such fluctuations (this is entailed by
Boltzmann’s statistical measure); nor the fact that the local initial condi-
tions are of extremely low probability (this results from a distribution over
all domains); but the fact that we happen to live in such an atypical region
of the “grand total” which is almost always in equilibrium. And that is to
be explained by showing why the observed entropy gradient is necessary for
our existence as intelligent observers.3
2 Not to be confused with the multiverse of quantummechanics (“Everett’s multiverse”
= the totality of wavefunction branches). Here we refer to the multiverse of quantum
cosmology (“Linde’s multiverse” = set of different cosmological domains, possibly causally
and/or topologically disconnected from ours). This distinction does not preclude the
relationship between the two, however. But that relationship belongs to the quantum-
cosmological domain and is certainly beyond the scope of the present manuscript.
3 Note that we employ the term “acausal” here in the same sense as Price does: the
absence of law-like reason explaining a particular feature of the physical world. This
usage has nothing to do with Lorentz invariance, superluminal motions and the like! It
has been recognized for quite some time in the philosophy of physics that there are two
rather different meanings attached to the notion of “causality”. Causality as a geometrical
relation between events on the spacetime manifold is different from causality as an order
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From the point of view of the present Acausal-Anthropic approach,
Boltzmann (and his assisstant Dr. Shuetz to whom he gave credit for the
original idea; see Ref. 20) was on the right track in proposing what came
to be known as the “anthropic fluctuation” picture.(21) The idea was to ex-
plain the local thermodynamical disequilibrium by appealing to the size of
the universe and the conditions necessary for our existence. Remember the
famous words of the Viennese master(20):
If we assume the universe great enough, we can make the
probability of one relatively small part being in any given state
(however far from the state of thermal equilibrium), as great as
we please. We can also make the probability great that, though
the whole universe is in thermal equilibrium, our world is in
its present state. It may be said that the world is so far from
thermal equilibrium that we cannot imagine the improbability
of such a state. But can we imagine, on the other side, how
small a part of the whole universe this world is? Assuming the
universe great enough, the probability that such a small part of
it as our world should be in its present state, is no longer small.
In other words, in the Boltzmann-Schuetz view the world in general is in
the state of maximal entropy (“heat death”). We exist within a fluctuation
of low entropy (without reason, i.e. acausally!), which makes our existence
possible. Thus, any acausal version of the explanatory project on even
vaguely “Boltzmannian” grounds has to include the anthropic selection ef-
fect. Boltzmann and Schuetz thus, in our present view, were on the right
track, and could not have done better under the circumstances. What they
did lack was the input of modern cosmology, exemplified by the multiverse
concept.4 If we summon such help, we may truly inherit the Boltzmannian
project of setting up the explanatory proposal for the observed entropy
asymmetry.
How many domains are required in order to account for the observed
thermodynamical asymmetry? While the exact answer is difficult to con-
ceive, we may follow the lead of Penrose and use the Bekenstein-Hawking
formula(22,23) to estimate the lower limit on the size of ensemble of do-
mains in which we expect to find one similar to ours on purely probabilistic
relation between stages of a developing physical process. In accordance with Horwitz,
Arshansky, and Elitzur,(67) we may call the former spacetime causality and the latter
process causality. The Anthropic-Acausal approach described here is acausal in the sense
of process causality, not in the sense of spacetime causality.
4Boltzmann understood the difficulties of his position quite well; there are several
examples of his regarding his cosmological thoughts as remote speculations.
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grounds. Obviously, the celebrated Boltzmann formula S = lnW (in “nat-
ural” k = 1 units we shall use in the entire discussion) suggests that the
required number is Nmin ∼ expSmax, where Smax is the entropy of the state
of maximal probability of the matter in our domain (what would be tradi-
tionally called the entropy of the “heat death” state). However, our domain
is limited by our particle horizon at present, and will be almost certainly
limited(24,25) by an event horizon, due to the contribution ΩΛ of the vac-
uum energy density (“cosmological constant”). Numerically, the difference
between the two in the realistic case is not very large in cosmological terms
(∼1 Gpc), so we will not make a big error in attributing the state of low
entropy to those currently invisible (but visible to our descendants!) parts
of our domain between the particle and the event horizon. Thus, we need
to account for the entropy of matter of cosmological density Ωm (predom-
inantly in CDM or similar particles, with ∼15-20% of baryons). On the
assumption that our domain is globally flat, with no net electric charge and
no net angular momentum, we obtain:
Nmin ∼ expSmaxexpS0 =
1
expS0
exp
(
c3
Gh¯
A
4
)
= 1expS0 exp
(
4pi G
h¯c
m2
)
= 1expS0 exp
(
pi
Gh¯c
H40Ω
2
mR
6
h
)
,
(1)
whereH0 is the present-day Hubble constant, and Rh the size of the horizon.
Using the case of an event horizon which is fixed by the magnitude of the
cosmological constant only (e.g., Ref. 26),
Rh =
c
H0
√
ΩΛ
, (2)
we obtain the following remarkable expression (for the flat Ωm + ΩΛ = 1
universe):
Nmin ∼ exp
(
pi c5
Gh¯
Ω2m
Ω3Λ
1
H20
− S0
)
= exp
[
pi c5
Gh¯
Ω2m
(1− Ωm)3
1
H20
− S0
]
. (3)
We notice the appearance of all major constants of nature (including the
“silent” Boltzmann constant, which is omitted since we are working in “nat-
ural” units!) in this formula, with the exception of the elementary charge,
which is reasonable since we are dealing with the standard electrically neu-
tral universe. In addition, the total entropy of our cosmological domain, S0,
appears and it represents, in a sense, the outcome of all and every process
which has actually taken place since the beginning of time!
How big is the realistic entropy S0? The conventional answer is simple:
the entropy is by far dominated by the photons of the cosmic microwave
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background, whose specific entropy (“entropy-per-baryon”) is a well-known
dimensionless number (e.g., Ref. 21):
sCMB =
(
nγ
nB
)
0
≈ 108, (4)
where nγ and nB are number densities of photons and baryons respectively.
Taking the standard estimate that the total number of baryons within hori-
zon is ∼1080−81, we may be certain that S0 is not larger than 1090 (in natural
units as well).
The common numerical values of the cosmological parameters Ωm (≈
0.3) and H0 (≈ 60 km s−1 Mpc−1) inserted in (3) give us a stupendous
double exponential
Nmin ∼ exp
(
1.9 × 10121
)
. (!!!) (5)
At least that many domains in the multiverse are needed to account
for the observed asymmetry in this manner.(27) (This is easily generalized
to the case of charged or rotating universe characterized by some other
set of parameters, but their exact values make almost no difference when
numbers of such magnitude are involved.) This is the price one must pay for
embedding the atypical initial conditions into a wider manifold (see below,
§4). Of course, the total number of domains may be infinite, in which
case the conclusions of Ellis and Brundrit(28) will apply, and any worry
about the “specialty” of our initial conditions is immediately discarded. On
the truly global scale—i.e. in the multiverse—there is no thermodynamical
asymmetry, no arrow of time.
Note that the end result of both this and the two proposals Price describes—
given by the parsing schemes above—is the same: it is an observed asymme-
try. However, the attribute seems superfluous in both Acausal-Particular
and (especially) Causal-General approaches. It has no function at all in
either approach. Only in the anthropic approach advocated here it does re-
ceive a proper place in the core of the perceived explanandum. Is “observed”
in this context the same as “objective” or it is not? By equivocating on this,
Price attaches a strongly realist (indeed, essentialist) character to the two
approaches he favors. Boltzmann and Schuetz, on the contrary,adopt more
cautious stance and employ the attribute “observed” in its true and literal
meaning (i.e. observed by intelligent observers possessing specific capacities,
epistemic and otherwise).
In other words, a symbolic way of roughly representing the relationship of
the present approach to the Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis is the following
scheme:
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Acausal-Anthropic approach = (Boltzmann measure + anthropic selec-
tion effect) +
+ the multiverse =
= Boltzmann-Schuetz picture + the multiverse.
(It is necessary to qualify this as “roughly”, since the cosmological data
of the XX century has been fully taken into account in the present approach,
data which Boltzmann was, naturally, completely ignorant about.) The
multiverse or world ensemble has by now become quite a familiar term
to cosmologists, as well as to at least some philosophers. Thus, Bostrom
cogently writes:(29)
...The meaningfulness of the [world] ensemble hypothesis is
not much in question. Only those subscribing to a very strict
verificationist theory of meaning would deny that it is possible
that the world might contain a large set of causally fairly discon-
nected spacetime regions with varying physical parameters. And
even the most hardcore verificationist would be willing to con-
sider at least those ensemble theories according to which other
universes are in principle physically accessible from our own uni-
verse. (Such ensemble theories have been proposed, although
they represent only a special case of the general idea.)
The anthropic selection effect is nothing particularly new either. It was
the great French physicist, mathematician and philosopher Henry Poincare´
who first noted that the functioning of an intelligent mind would have been
impossible in an entropy-decreasing universe.(30) Later it was elaborated by
Norbert Wiener in his celebrated Cybernetics (Ref. 31, p. 35):
Indeed, it is a very interesting intellectual experiment to
make the fantasy of an intelligent being whose time should run
the other way to our own. To such a being, all communication
with us would be impossible. Any signal he might send would
reach us with a logical stream of consequents from his point of
view, antecedents from ours. These antecedents would already
be in our experience, and would have served to us as the natural
explanation of his signal, without presupposing an intelligent
being to have sent it. If he drew us a square, we should see
the remains of his figure as its precursors, and it would seem to
be the curious crystallization—always perfectly explainable—of
these remains. Its meaning would seem to be as fortuitous as
the faces we read into mountains and cliffs. The drawing of the
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square would appear to us as a catastrophe—sudden indeed, but
explainable by natural laws—by which that square would cease
to exist. Our counterpart would have exactly similar ideas con-
cerning us. Within any world with which we can communicate,
the direction of time is uniform.
What the father of modern computer science had in mind, is that the ex-
istence of an entropy gradient of particular size in a sufficiently large region
of space is a necessary precondition for the cognitive operations of intelligent
life as we know it. In order to immediately preempt any misgivings about
the alleged anthropocentrism which undeservedly follow practically any an-
thropic argument, it should be explicitly stated that this property does not
have any particular association with homo sapiens (except the trivial and
temporary one that we are the only certain example of intelligent observers
known so far; that circumstance is likely to change soon, as a result of either
SETI or AI efforts).
Of course, the premiss that intelligent observers select particular en-
tropic behavior (and thus entail a temporal asymmetry) should not be taken
for granted—and here we come to the crux of the explanatory task ahead.
Instead of searching for strange, hitherto never seen time-asymmetric mi-
croprocesses (as in the Causal-General approach), or attempt to find a new
law applying to global singularities (as in the Acausal-Particular approach),
here we would like to investigate and ascertain why intelligent observers
are dependent on the entropy gradient to function. This, obviously, brings
explanatory tasks into the realm of information theory, but also to the dis-
ciplines like complexity theory, cognitive sciences, and neurosciences. But
this does not mean these are not physical questions! An awareness that the
link between information theory and various physical theories is the cen-
tre piece of any attempt at understanding nature has been rapidly growing
over several decades. Since the brilliant book by Brillouen(32), physicists
are gradually getting accustomed to the idea, (e.g., Refs. 33-35), and this
struck cord with philosophers too (for a particularly nice example, see Ref.
36). On the other hand, the working philosophy of computationalism has
become established as the basis of the bulk of cognitive sciences(37). In
all quarters one may nowadays hear scholarly debates on “physical reduc-
tionism”, “monism”, “physicalism” and many other labels which pertain to
essentially the same thing: that cognition (and the various phenomena asso-
ciated with it, including the apparent temporal asymmetry) is, in principle,
explicable in physical terms. That we are still far from such an explanation,
is certainly unnecessary to elaborate upon. Thus, the project suggested here
is neither non-physical nor easy!5
5 As an aside, let us note that the issue of the psychological arrow of time has been
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We notice that this still represents the one-asymmetry approach, a sort
of a cousin to the Acausal-Particular approach. However, the asymmetry
is located at a different place from the one in the Acausal-Particular ap-
proach favored by Price. Very roughly speaking, we need information the-
ory and cognitive science rather than quantum gravity or even the “Theory
of Everything”—which presumably, although Price remains silent on the
issue, determines the nature of the initial low-entropy conditions necessary
for operation of the Acausal-Particular mechanism. The fact that we seem
to know more about the former than about the latter (especially since quan-
tum cosmology, through its multiverse theories, demonstrates that the true
“Theory of Everything” may not exist at all; cf. Refs. 40-42) is another
advantage of the Acausal-Anthropic approach.
A possible objection against this explanatory project may be formulated
as follows. How did the multiverse come into being? If it came into being
by, say, a particular form of spontaneous symmetry breaking, would not
that count as manifestly unidirectional process in time? In other words,
it may look as if the concept of the multiverse itself presumes an arrow
of time.6 This certainly contradicts what we have said about Boltzmann’s
statistical measure and the totality of cosmological domains being in per-
petual thermodynamic equilibrium. Two recourses are available for defense
of the Acausal-Anthropic approach, both belonging to the core of quan-
tum cosmology (and the accompanying ontology) and each being worthy
a lengthy discourse in its own right. First, we may argue that the multi-
verse, being the grand stage for everything that happens, holds a privileged
position and is not further explicable. So, any theory pertaining to ex-
plain the multiverse itself would be superfluous, since the multiverse is a
“brute fact”. This would be the most straightforward generalization of the
original Boltzmann-Schuetz idea (cf. Chapter 2 of Ref. 43). A more in-
teresting defensive strategy would be to argue that the critique actually
restricts a range of possible multiverses to those which are, in Linde’s terms
“eternal, self-reproducing fractals.” Its eternal nature obviates the need
for explaining its origination, and its self-reproducing feature enables what
philosophers call “explanatory self-subsumption.” If the principle necessar-
lightly and casually dismissed by most writers of the temporal (a)symmetry as a (matter-
of-course) consequence of the thermodynamical arrow (e.g. Ref. 38). This uncritical
behavior has been criticized in the influential paper of John Earman(39), and we might
add only that, given the contemporary state of the issue, the critique has been too mild!
There is no single piece of hard evidence produced so far that the psychological arrow
can be reduced in such way to the thermodynamical one; one of the priority tasks within
the proposed Acausal-Anthropic approach would be to clarify this difficult issue from the
point of view of the information theory and cognitive sciences.
6 Special thanks are due to one of the anonymous referees for bringing the author’s
attention to this interesting point.
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ily has the feature it speaks of, then it necessarily will apply to itself (cf.
Ref. 44). Individual domains—“universes”—are created and destroyed (for
instance, through return to the Planck space-time foam upon recollapse),
but the multiverse itself stays completely time-reversible. Of course, further
elaboration of these ideas is certainly necessary, but the objection does not
seem to be fatal at the moment.
So, what are the additional benefits of this project, beyond a novel look
at the explanandum of thermodynamical asymmetry? We have already seen
some of them: dropping the ceteris paribus clause, for instance. We are now
free to state that entropy is always high in by far the predominant part of
everything that exists. Thus we avoid “a surprising consequence of the
one-asymmetry view:”(9) the fact that Boltzmann’s statistics—being based
upon temporally symmetric probabilities—implies high entropy in the past
as well as in the future. And we avoid it in a natural and simple manner,
which Boltzmann has endorsed himself!
However, the greatest advantage comes from the possibility of connecting
to cosmology, and especially contemporary currents in quantum cosmology.
This is achieved without much further effort which the Acausal-Particular
approach necessitates. From Bruno, who argued for innumerable worlds by
using a specific form of the principle of plenitude, to Hume and his “innu-
merable worlds botched and bungled,” to Linde, Vilenkin and other modern
cosmologists, as well as some respected contemporary philosophers,(43,45)
people by and large did not take this issue lightly and casually. There are
several different approaches which all lead to the conclusion that what we
perceive as our cosmological domain is just a minuscule fraction of every-
thing that exists (cf. Refs. 40, 46).
A brief historical aside seems due at the end of this section. The Acausal-
Anthropic view in the modern (post-Boltzmann) sense was first formulated
by Clutton-Brock(47). As the story often goes, this highly unorthodox con-
tribution was published in an astronomical journal of rather modest circu-
lation and went almost unnoticed. Clutton-Brock explicitly considered the
distribution of the initial entropy-per-baryon over the set of existing worlds,
and concluded that only a relatively narrow range of this quantity permits
the formation of the complex structures we perceive and, presumably, the
formation of life itself.7 The importance of his results has, however, been
slightly obscured by some unnecessary assumptions, as well as by confusion
over the two types of the multiverse that have been proposed (see footnote
2). Similar analysis for the parameter Q, describing the amplitude of cos-
mic microwave background fluctuations, has been given only recently by
7 It should be noted that Clutton-Brock was not dogmatic on this; in Ref. 48 he
proposes a version of the Gold model close to the one Price favors.
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Tegmark and Rees(49), who discuss the anthropic selection effects plausibly
underlying the magnitude of the anisotropies of the early universe, as de-
tected recently with COBE. This point is directly related to the problem of
low initial entropy, since these authors correctly identify the amplitude of
these fluctuations in microwave background radiation with the amplitude
of gravitational potential fluctuations in the early universe when they enter
the horizon. The observed fact that this number is of the order of Q ∼
10−5 cannot be derived from known physical theories, and—as Tegmark and
Rees emphasize at the very beginning of their paper—one may either wait
for some future fundamental theory from which Qcould be computed or take
the option (supported independently by various inflationary scenarios) that
it is effectively a random number drawn from some wide distribution whose
observed values will be constrained by the anthropic selection. What they
persuasively demonstrate in the rest of their paper is that such constraints
are effective in keeping the expected observed value in the approximate in-
terval 10−6 ≤ Q ≤ 10−4.
3. IS BOLTZMANN-SCHUETZ INTRINSICALLY
UNTENABLE?
What problems may the Acausal-Anthropic view face? There are two ob-
jections to the Boltzmann-Schuetz version of this view, both of which have
surfaced from time to time in the literature. We shall denote each by using
the names of the two famous 20th century physicists who elucidated them.
Before we investigate their status, two issues should be kept in mind.
(I) Strictly speaking, the Acausal-Anthropic view we propose does not
need to answer these objections, since the multiverse is not necessarily the
same topologically connected entity to which these objection refer. How-
ever, we shall show the weakness of these arguments even against the clas-
sical Boltzmann-Schuetz picture, in order to re-display the one-sidedness of
Price’s account, who almost casually dismisses this proposition.8 An impor-
tant motivation for doing this is that we are still very much in the dark about
the detailed physical nature of the multiverse (and in particular, the issue
of its causal structure). But, obviously, if we weaken the arguments against
the “one- domain” anthropic picture (i.e. the classical Boltzmann-Schuetz
view), the multiverse view may just benefit.
(II) Any reasonable defense of the Boltzmann-Schuetz picture must be
qualified, since the progress of modern cosmology has made obsolete prac-
8 Telling is his locution that anthropic selection suggested by Boltzmann makes “this
option less unappealing than it initially seems.” (Ref. 9, §3.4—underlined by M. M. C´.)
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tically all ideas about the universe on the largest scales which were current
at the end of the 19th century.9 Thus, this theory is certainly indefensi-
ble when set against the objection that the empirically established age of
(our) universe is much shorter than the timescale required for large entropy
fluctuations. Many other—mainly astrophysical— objections, related to in-
homogeneities in the distribution of matter, the universal photon heat bath,
entropy production in stars and black holes, quantum properties of matter,
the existence of horizons, etc., could also be stated if the Boltzmann-Schuetz
picture is to be taken literally nowadays. After all, that is the main reason
why we have adjoined the multiverse concept to this picture in presenting
the Acausal-Anthropic view above. In contrast, in the rest of this section
we shall question the intrinsic tenability of the Boltzmann-Schuetz picture,
without entering too much into the empirical considerations stemming from
perceived astrophysics. The point is to show that the classical objections are
significantly overrated, and that by embedding this picture into contempo-
rary multiverse theories we can gain much more than we can lose. In other
words, the death of the anthropic-fluctuation picture has been somewhat
prematurely proclaimed.
That said, let us consider the argument Price and other critics put for-
ward against the Boltzmann-Shuetz view. We have:
1. Feynman’s argument (FA): why is the size of low-entropy fluc-
tuation so much larger than is necessary for the emergence of intelligent
observers on Earth?(50)
2. von Weizsa¨cker’s argument (vWA): How could we believe the
information of a low entropy past, when a smaller (and eo ipso likelier)
fluctuation is sufficient to produce such (false or misleading) evidence?(51)
Let us consider FA first. There is an obvious way out (first hinted at by
Schelling in the early 19th century!): simply deny the antecedent—namely
the assertion that less (low entropy) space is required for the emergence of in-
telligent observers than we perceive. This assertion is by no means obvious,
since we still know too little about the physical and chemical preconditions
for the origin of life, not to mention intelligence. Suppose, for instance, that
the conventional Oparin-Haldane (“warm little pond”) hypothesis for the
origin of life (e.g., Ref. 52) is unsupported or wrong (as many researchers
have claimed; e.g., Refs. 53-55). The most serious scientific alternative
to the received view is the panspermia hypothesis: the view that life was
formed at some other place in the universe and has been brought to Earth
via either terrestrial encounters with interstellar dust, clouds or comets or
9This point is probably the content of Price’s remark (Ref. 8, §1) that “this strategy
[Boltzmann-Schuetz], never entirely satisfactory, seems to have been decisively overturned
by recent work in cosmology.”
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even the intentional action of an advanced galactic civilization(56−58) . It is
immediately clear that the size requirements of these two views (Oparin-
Haldane vs. panspermia) are significantly different. If the a priori prob-
ability of a spontaneous assembly of complex molecules necessary for the
creation of life is of the order of 10–3000 (or even less, as has been suggested
in the references critical of the received view), then we are entitled to insist
on a much larger spatiotemporal volume than the conventional “warm lit-
tle pond” on a single planet. Such a larger volume is necessary even if we
know, for instance, of only one single isolated human observer in his cubicle
somewhere on Earth.
An FA proponent could retort that panspermia is a highly speculative
idea. Of course, it certainly is to a degree because science lacks the universal
yardstick of “speculativeness”. The received view is also quite speculative.10
But another point is central here. Not wishing to enter into a biological
discussion about which of these options is more likely to account for the
totality of empirical data, it seems clear that we should not presume any
one of them to be correct when evaluating proposals for the origin of the
entropy gradient—and that is exactly what FA does. It puts the explanatory
cart in front of the horse.
Weakness of FA is graphically manifested if we try to cast it into a
somewhat more rigorous form. Let us consider a causal chain of n events
e1, e2, ..., en leading to the emergence of intelligent life capable of reading
Feynman and Price:
e1 ⇒ e2 ⇒ ...⇒ en = existence of sophisticated int. obs. onEarth, (6)
(for the sake of the argument, we shall assume that n is a finite natural
number, and that there is a well-defined first member of the sequence).
Examples of links in this chain are the formation of oxygen in the primitive
Earth’s atmosphere, or the synthesis of 12C in stars through the triple-α
reaction.(55,59) Now, we can, in principle, assign a volume V(ei) to all links
in the chain as
V(ei) ≡ minimal spatial volume necessary for ei to occur,
which is intuitively clear (one cannot expect galaxy formation to occur
within 3.6 m3, etc.). FA can therefore be translated as a statement
(∀i)V (ei)≪ (RH)3, (7)
where (RH)
3 is any prototype of the representative part of the observable
universe, which may be visualized as a cube with sides equal to the Hubble
10 And the Gold-type recollapsing universe suggested by Price in the context of his
favorite Acausal-Particular approach is far more so.
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radius (or less, depending on our assessment of the high-redshift astrophys-
ical data). Is (7) the truth so self-evident that anybody (with Boltzmann
and Schuetz) who doubts it may be casually dismissed as “ridiculous”? Not
likely. What is max[V(ei)]? Not so obvious either. As Barrow and Tipler
(21)
correctly note, if the process of cosmological structure formation is a nec-
essary part of the causal chain (6), we have every reason to believe the
contrary proposition, namely (e.g., Ref. 60)
(∃j) V (ej) ≈ (RH)3. (8)
Of course, this is part of the modern, evolutionist view; in the time of
Boltzmann and Schuetz, everything was considerably easier, since the Hub-
ble expansion and consequent developments were more than thirty years in
the future. Nowadays, one may justifiably ask whether RH in (7) and (8)
should be temporally indexed, so that it pertains to the relevant cosmo-
logical scale at epoch of ei. This makes FA even less persuasive: if some
perturbation, phase transition, or any other part of the quantum cosmolog-
ical lore is truly necessary for our emergence as intelligent beings, then we
have every right to conclude that the entire observable universe is an “all
or nothing” matter.(40)
Another way to visualize this option is to imagine that there is a mini-
mum spatial volume (or “cell”) which is necessary in order for intelligence to
arise at a single point within such volume. Each point in spacetime is either
within a cell or it is not. If you are within a cell, then you perceive stars,
galaxies, etc.—the entire familiar low-entropy universe. If you are not, then
you perceive something of high entropy, presumably lots of black holes—but
you cannot be there. How big is the volume of the smallest cell? Feynman
estimates it to be much smaller than the observed universe (essentially the
Hubble sphere); still there is no argument except crude intuition to that
effect.
Price himself testifies that vWA is not an overwhelmingly persuasive
objection: when treating globally symmetric cosmologies (a` la Gold) he
explicitly dismisses vWA—and in a footnote at that, obviously not deeming
it necessary to invoke an elaborate explanation. The same issue happens in
his discourse on the epistemology of the relationship between randomness
and high entropy (footnotes 6 and 7 in Ref. 9): “Again, I am ignoring von
Weizsa¨cker’s sceptical difficulties about inference to the past.” Remarks
such as this provoke a simple question which one is fully entitled to ask of
Price: can von Weizsa¨cker’s view be ignored or not, in the final analysis?
Because, if it is not ignored when disputing the anthropic approach to the
explanatory project (and thus, indirectly, disputing what we have called the
Acausal-Anthropic approach), and simultaneously it is conveniently ignored
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in the elaboration of the Acausal-Particular approach, then it seems clear
that we are operating a double standard.
However, in order to be fair toward vWA, we should not construe this
double standard as a counter-argument. A true counter-argument is to ana-
lyze things further: what exactly in vWA is problematic for the Boltzmann-
Schuetz picture? Of course, vWA ridicules our epistemic capacities—but
that is non sequitur. Remember that Boltzmann and Schuetz arrived at
their view exactly starting from a high-entropy default condition, which
does not call for an explanation (as Price is entirely correct in proclaim-
ing). They have not relied in deriving their hypothesis on any one specific
piece of empirical data, in particular any empirical data telling of past con-
ditions of the universe. Thus, their hypothesis cannot be refuted by accept-
ing that such-and-such empirical data which tells us about a low-entropy
past is either “simulated” or invalid. vWA may conflict with propositions
embodying the weak anthropic principle (that the values of physical and
cosmological parameters are constrained through the requirement of exis-
tence of the carbon-based life, sufficiently stable conditions, etc.), but that
is only because anthropic theoreticians have not bothered to cope with the
case of simulated evidence. Another issue is that “simulation” cannot be as
simple as it is tacitly assumed in von Weizsa¨cker’s or Price’s account; the
fact that we observe coherent information flow from the past to the present
(as, for instance, in the Collins’ postulate of uniform thermal histories; Ref.
61) seems just a coincidence on this account. This is consequence of the fact
that information-theoretical background of this possibility has not been in-
vestigated in detail so far. The status of vWA, thus, is that it shows a
bizarre and unexpected side of the Boltzmann-Schuetz view, but does not
reveal true contradiction or incoherency.
Also, one is prompted to ask: how exactly do we prove that “simula-
tion” is cheaper (in entropy terms) than “reality” in all (or just most of)
cases? Again, the opponent of Boltzmann-Schuetz (von Weizsa¨cker this
time) offers just a hunch and “common sense” intuitions. The question is
admittedly difficult and depends again on the information-theoretical un-
certainties mentioned above. There is at least one serious study claiming
the contrary, the one of Tegmark;(35) or, more precisely, it claims that in
cases of an extremely high degree of symmetry (with help of Everett’s quan-
tum theory and the environmental decoherence), the algorithmic informa-
tion content of the entire observable universe may be very small, essentially
the same one as in the earliest moments of its existence. In Tegmark’s
view (especially appealing to cognitive scientists and information theory re-
searchers), the whole is much simpler than its parts, and almost everything
we perceive is a sort of illusion. In particular, the apparent complexity of
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everything around us—not just evidence of the past—is illusory (or ”simu-
lated”)! We may find Tegmark wrong on several issues, but the lesson of his
work is that our current methods (in the theory of complexity and related
disciplines) are far from being entirely reliable and disputable in the matter
of the entropy cost of perceived pieces of reality.
Let us note that the two arguments discussed in this section are not
even strictly co-tenable. FA cannot be coherently formulated if we assume
that vWA is correct (since what then is the size which matters? how can we
define it, since our knowledge on the properties of life itself—not to mention
the standards of measurement—is based upon simulated evidence?). Con-
versely, on FA it would be idle speculation to ask “what is the real nature
of the universe outside of our small confines?”, as vWA would prompt us
to. (One may play off one against the other, claiming that, for instance, an
intelligence-bearing cell of necessary low entropy is the size of our Galaxy,
and all extragalactic information is simulated. There have been similar
suggestions in the older cosmological literature and in a different context,
notably so-called McCrea’s uncertainties; see Ref. 62)
4. EMBEDDING THE ATYPICAL INITIAL CONDITIONS
It has been well-known for quite some time that there are three basic ap-
proaches to answering the question “Why the initial conditions of the uni-
verse were such-and-such?” The first rejects the validity of the question.
It may be motivated either by positivistic refusal to discuss issues forever
closed to any form of direct verification or theological reasons (all standard
theistic accounts of the creation belong to this option). This rather nihilistic
option should only be entertained as a truly last resort, a counsel of despair.
Of the other two, one—causal—entails the idea that there is a law-like rea-
son (presumably to be derived from the future “Theory of Everything”) for
the atypical or surprising structure of the early universe. In other words, an
enormous amount of information, necessary for the description of the atyp-
ical initial conditions, can be encoded in some new law(s) of nature and
consequent law-like correlations of various matter and vacuum fields. The
other—anthropic—option avoids giving a specific description by embedding
those conditions into a sufficiently symmetric background. Again, stated
in terms of information, the same long description of what we perceive as
atypical initial conditions arises—as so often in physics!—from the process
of symmetry breaking. The overall description is simple enough, and may be
reduced (in the extreme case) to a rule similar to “All possible combinations
of initial conditions exist.” That such a high degree of symmetry can indeed
completely reproduce the situation in our particular domain becomes then
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an immediate consequence (cf. Refs. 35, 63).11
In a sense, the appeal of the anthropic selection effect is, figuratively
speaking, to kill two birds with one stone: to set up a project for the expla-
nation of common thermodynamical asymmetry and to obtain the cheapest
possible (in both physical and epistemological terms) explanation of the ini-
tial conditions, in particular vis-a`-vis cosmological fine tunings. Appeal to
the multiverse enables us to “cleanse the door of perception” and overcome
the narrow coffines of our specially restricted viewpoint.
Price’s suggestion (Ref. 8, §3.3) that the anthropic selection effect(s)
may be necessary only for an explanation of the initial conditions of our
domain—and even then it is obviously less interesting option for him, since
it can be conveniently “ignored”—certainly does not do justice to the scope
and ingenuity of anthropic reasoning. His preferred option, the existence of a
law-like reason for low entropy is, in effect, a strange retreat from the acausal
behavior of thermodynamical systems correctly emphasized at the present
time. Granted that there may be interesting reasons for exploring the law-
like possibility, we are still entitled to ask: why should one, after rejecting
the law-like behavior of matter in the present epoch, ask for a new law-
like behavior in epochs long gone—say at Planck time—to explain the very
same thing? Especially if a plausible (and rather more “Boltzmannian”)
anthropic alternative is at hand?
5. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that a generalized Boltzmann-Schuetz or Acausal-Anthropic
11 A brief literary analogy may be helpful here. In the beautiful story of “The Li-
brary of Babel”, Jorge Luis Borges has described a world consisting of a huge library in
which piles of seemingly completely random books are stored.(64) The nature and content
of each book look extremely puzzling to the inhabitants of that world, most of whom
have never encountered a book with a single meaningful line. Gradually, they reveal the
truth: although each book per se requires lots of information to be described—“long
description”—the entire content of the Library is extraordinary simple: it is completely
described by the following proposition: All variations of letters and punctuation marks
exist in the Library. Thus, although lost works of Plato or Tacitus are certainly located
somewhere in the Library (and are presumably unique), the wealth of information they
contain from a human perspective is completely lost among myriads of less and less similar
copies of the supposed original, and myriads of completely worthless “chaotic” volumes.
Similarly with the multiverse. A book containing perfect Socratic dialogues stands in the
same relation towards the Library as a domain containing intelligent observers relates to
everything that exists. Note that the number of books in the Library is, as an anonymous
genius discovers in the story, still finite, although incredibly huge, and thus the number
of meaningful books is not of measure zero in the entire set. Similar is the situation with
the domains of the multiverse, as discussed above. In the infinite case, the number of
those allowing for emergence of intelligent observers is probably of measure zero.
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approach may be able to account for the perceived thermodynamical asym-
metry at least in the same degree as the other approaches explicated in
the recent literature. Neither of the two conventional arguments is really
decisive and sufficient to reject the Boltzmann-Schuetz anthropic fluctua-
tion picture. A fortiori, these are either irrelevant or insufficient to reject
the Acausal-Anthropic view proposed here. (Which makes this approach
largely insensitive as to the speculative issue of the exact physical nature of
the domains within the multiverse.)
An enormous additional benefit comes, of course, from being able to
account for other anthropic coincidences (or ’fine-tunings’) within the same
conceptual framework received from the rapidly developing ideas of quan-
tum cosmology. Further advantages include a connection with the latest
thinking in quantum cosmology (incorporating the idea of the multiverse),
dropping of the ceteris paribus clause in specification of the default thermo-
dynamical condition, better accounting for thermodynamical counterfactu-
als and obviation of the necessity to double-deal with cosmological data. At
the same time, many of the virtues of the Acausal-Particular approach are
retained in the Acausal-Anthropic picture.
Future behavior of the universe is rapidly becoming a recognized and
legitimate target for “everyday” scientific work, and less and less an arena
for wild speculation and “grand principles.”(65) The nascent discipline of
physical eschatology (e.g., Ref. 66) has already reached many interesting
results, and it is highly misleading to present contemporary astrophysicists
as ignorant about the subject as their colleagues in the time of Boltzmann
or Haldane or Gold. According to unequivocal conclusion drawn from these
empirical developments, the asymptotic final state of our cosmological do-
main (or “universe”) will be one of extremely diluted matter and extremely
high entropy (at least as long as one keeps possible intentional actions of
advanced intelligent communities out of the picture).
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